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The United States wants to end “forever wars” in the Middle East, among 
them the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Much to Turkey’s dismay, 
Kurdish forces were crucial on-the-ground allies in that pursuit. While the 
military battle is subsiding, the question has arisen of how the new US ad-
ministration will politically approach its Kurdish allies and deal with Tur-
key’s expansionism in the future.
 • Turkish expansionism worries the European Union and United States, despite it 
having been facilitated by them in the past: Both entities allowed Turkish president 
Erdoğan to expand militarily into Kurdish areas in Syria and Iraq without any pol­
itical repercussions from his Western allies. Therefore, a currently untamed and 
unilaterally acting Turkey will be one of Biden’s greatest challenges in the region.
 • Biden will campaign for an end to endless wars, as Trump did, but he also 
knows that an abrupt withdrawal of US forces is not a solution. Rather, a com-
prehensive post-war structure for Syria must be drafted, in which the Syrian 
Democratic Forces should play a crucial role. The main obstacle to such an 
encompassing agreement will be Turkey.
 • The Kurdistan Region of Iraq represents a historical precedent that should not 
be copied. Since 2016, Turkey has increasingly and repeatedly targeted civilians 
there, even though the region’s Kurdish administration formally cooperates 
with Turkey. The short-sighted approach that the United States took vis-à-vis 
the Iraqi Kurds – only granting them autonomy if they agree to act as a proxy 
force for Turkey – has enabled this.
 • Joe Biden as well as his secretaries of state and of defense, respectively Antony 
Blinken and Lloyd Austin, have much experience on the Kurdish question and, 
to some extent, strong pro-Kurdish records. They will likely push for a compro-
mise between Kurdish actors and Turkey in the time to come. 
Policy Implications
To achieve long-lasting stability concerning the Kurdish question, Biden’s ad-
ministration should design policies that aim to prevent Turkish unilateralism 
and facilitate peace talks between Ankara and especially the PKK leadership, 
in cooper ation with partners in the European Union. Furthermore, the political 
recognition of the Kurds in Syria is central to defending the gains made against 
ISIS.
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Past US Policies between the Kurds and Turkey
There is unquestionably a great sense of “war fatigue” in the United States, with 
bipartisan support for the notion that “forever wars” must end. However, when in 
October 2019 then-president Donald Trump ordered the sudden withdrawal of US 
forces from Kurdish­ruled northeastern Syria, where since 2014 the fight against 
the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been spearheaded, shock 
and anger were expressed by politicians such as Joe Biden, Nancy Pelosi, and even 
staunch Trump supporters – for example, Lindsey Graham. Donald Trump turned 
his back on his Kurdish allies of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and provided 
an opening for Turkey, which went on to attack the Autonomous Administration 
of North and East Syria (AANES, also known as Rojava) just hours after Trump’s 
announcement. One of the only places where US involvement seemed to have some 
positive effect in fighting terrorism was abandoned. 
One politician who had very clear words for what he felt about Trump’s sudden 
move was Joe Biden, who on 20 January of this year was sworn in as the new US 
president. On 16 October 2019, just a week after Trump had ordered the withdrawal 
of US troops, Biden made the following statement at a campaign stop in Iowa: “Our 
commanders across the board, former and present, are ashamed of what’s happen-
ing here. […] Turkey is the real problem here. And I would be having a real locked-
down conversation with Erdoğan and letting him know that he’s gonna pay a heavy 
price for what he has done. Now. Pay that price” (Biden 2019).
War fatigue aside, the happenings of October 2019 showed two things: First, an 
uncalculated withdrawal of US troops can undo any success had over years of fight-
ing terrorism in the Middle East. Second, NATO partner Turkey and its unilateral 
interventionism pose an emerging threat. More specifically, in Syria and Iraq, Tur-
key prioritises the fight against independent Kurdish self­rule over anything else, 
even demonstrating its willingness to put at risk what was achieved in six years 
of containing ISIS. Behind this is Ankara’s intransigence towards the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK), which has weakened the US-
led coalition’s fight against ISIS. Turkey’s unilateral military actions in both Syria 
and Iraq also pose a threat to the region at large and are pushing the AANES into an 
ever-growing humanitarian crisis.
With Joe Biden as the new US president, the question emerges of whether he 
and his cabinet will approach President Erdoğan as forcefully as he promised dur-
ing his campaign. Essentially, the new US administration will have to deal with an 
unpredictably behaving NATO ally (Turkey) on the one hand and the United States’ 
only on-the-ground Kurdish ally in Syria (the SDF) on the other. This year will like-
ly see an additional escalation of the conflict in northern Syria; what Biden’s presi-
dency will need with regard to Turkey as the greatest obstacle is a clear strategy.
Why the West Tolerates Turkey’s Expansionism
Currently, Turkey is active in a record number of military conflicts in Europe, the 
Middle East, and beyond. Turkey is militarily engaged in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, Nagorno­Karabakh, Cyprus, Libya, Syria, and specifically in Kurdish­ruled 
 areas of Iraq and Syria. Turkey has been acting more and more unilaterally and 
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without coordination with its NATO partners, its purchase of Russian S-400s mark-
ing just one of many escalations in this regard. Further, the Eastern Mediterranean 
crisis deepened in 2020, creating more pressure among European Union countries 
such as Greece, Cyprus, and France to more strongly oppose Turkey’s foreign pol-
icy. In the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, which 
started in fall 2020, Turkey sided with the latter. As clearly as this growing Turkish 
expansionism has emerged, as reluctant have the EU and the US become to counter 
these ambitions. Their approach towards Turkey, a country that joined NATO as 
early as 1952, has been one of appeasement.
The current reluctance towards Turkey has three different dimensions: First, 
the EU cannot exert pressure on Turkey even if it would like to, because of several 
dependencies. On one side, there is Germany, an old partner to Turkey in the EU 
that will veto any attempt by EU states to sanction the country. Germany has re-
peatedly backed Turkey in internal EU negotiations. The EU is further guided by the 
refugee deal of 2016, by which Turkey has agreed to keep migrants from entering 
Greece in exchange for financial aid and concessions on visa­free travel for Turkish 
citizens to the EU. Second, pressure on Turkey has never been exerted thoroughly 
by the West, since it has been too important of an ally to be marginalised. Not even 
three military coups from 1960 to 1980 have remotely changed Turkey’s status. 
It seems that whatever regime has ruled Turkey it has never bothered the West, 
as long as geostrategic allyships were kept intact. Third, the strategic partnership 
with the US became much more personalised in the face of Donald Trump’s pres-
idency. On top of the aforementioned geopolitical dependencies, Trump’s presi-
dency brought in the factor of his own private business relationships to Ankara. 
Although the Special Counsel investigation against Trump focused on Russia, the 
role of Turkish meddling with figures of the Trump administration as well as with 
his private businesses cannot be underestimated when examining these policy deci-
sions (Kirkpatrick and Lipton 2019). 
In Donald Trump’s continuing to appeasement of Turkey, he went so far as to 
abandon the United States’ only on-the-ground ally against ISIS, the SDF, in Octo-
ber 2019 by withdrawing US troops from northeastern Syria. The Turkish invasion 
that followed just minutes after Trump’s announcement can therefore be consid-
ered the product of years of reluctance, both by the EU and the US, to check Tur-
key; this reluctance is based on long­held geostrategic considerations and has more 
recently been fortified by private business ties. This path dependency has immense 
repercussions for the people in the region and the fight against ISIS.
As Figure 1 shows, between October and November 2019, the Turkish invasion 
spread over the whole northern sphere of the AANES, focusing not only on strategic 
positions but also on densely populated areas. This made Operation Peace Spring, 
as it was named by Turkey, not only one of the deadliest Turkish operations in Syria, 
but also one with the biggest infrastructural and humanitarian repercussions. It 
led to more than 1,000 deaths, 200,000 displaced individuals, and a humanitarian 
crisis that is worsening every day (Balanche 2020). During the Turkish advance, 
many imprisoned ISIS fighters escaped SDF prisons: since SDF forces were busy 
fighting against the Turkish military, dozens of these Islamist fighters were able to 
flee, which significantly strengthened the ISIS presence in rural Syria afterwards 
(Khalifa 2020). Furthermore, the Syrian National Army (SNA), which carried out 
the ground offensive on behalf of Turkey, has been known to host Islamists in their 
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ranks, committing human rights abuses, and practising targeted violence against 
minorities and women. On the humanitarian and infrastructural level, Turkish in-
volvement also had major repercussions. Turkey, for example, has repeatedly cut off 
water from the Alouk water station, which provides drinking water for the Hasaka 
area, where thousands of internally displaced persons reside. Turkey has also not 
allowed NGOs or humanitarian organisations to cross the border to AANES through 
Turkey, endangering the livelihoods of millions (O’Donnell, Klimov, and Barr 2020).
From Military to Political Recognition of the Kurds
The military confrontation in Syria is largely over, and the post-war structure of 
the country is something that must be tackled internationally, no matter the level 
of war fatigue. Turkey, however, has denied the SDF any political, diplomatic, and 
hence post­conflict recognition and has for years blocked its representation in mul-
tilateral talks, accusing the SDF of terrorism and support for the PKK. Standard 
analyses suggest that the solution is therefore in the hands of the SDF (e.g. Khalifa 
2020). These analyses propose that if the SDF were to distance itself more force-
fully from the PKK, Turkey could be calmed. That advice is, however, misleading 
and fails to consider two central characteristics that highlight that this conflict is 
not only between the SDF and Turkey but contains a transnational dimension that 
demands a comprehensive resolution. 
First, nothing can be done to defend against the PKK accusation as long as Tur-
key uses it as a political instrument; it has proven an infinitely stretchable claim for 
the country. It is this political character of the claim that shows how indispensable 
a resolution to the conflict is. After the peace talks with jailed PKK founder Abdul-
Figure 1 
Actors and Fatalities 
in the Turkish “Oper­
ation Peace Spring”
Source: Map created 
by author. Data are from 
Raleigh et al. (2010), 
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lah Öcalan that began in 2013, Turkey claimed to be open to a political solution to 
the Kurdish conflict. Both sides agreed to support the parliamentary participation 
of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), and the PKK 
agreed to call a ceasefire and retreat out of Turkey into the Kandil Mountains in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). As soon as Erdoğan and his Justice and Develop-
ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) lost the absolute majority in the wake 
of high turnout for the HDP in the 2015 elections, and violent conflict restarted in 
various cities in southeastern Turkey, the Turkish government not only called off 
further peace talks with the PKK but even claimed that none had ever happened. 
A large segment of the thousands of HDP MPs and regional politicians that have 
been arrested in recent years have specifically been accused of having links to the 
PKK. The PKK accusation is therefore not exclusively a claim made towards the 
SDF for having alleged direct links to the outlawed group, but it has been a political 
instrument used for decades to repress oppositional groups and parties, minorities, 
figures from civil society, and journalists. It is therefore a political accusation from 
which no one can clear themselves.
The second important aspect that evinces the transnational dimension of the con-
flict is the fact that Kurdish parties distancing themselves from the PKK has proven 
insufficient to achieve peace with Turkey, as developments in northern Iraq have 
demonstrated. The KRI became a de facto autonomous region under Kurdish rule 
as early as 1991, directly after the Second Gulf War. In 1992 then-Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein agreed to allow Turkey to enter Iraqi air space in its war against 
the PKK. According to the US-mediated 1998 Ankara Statement and the Washing-
ton Agreement, one of the key concessions that the ruling Patriotic Union of Kurd-
istan (Yekîtiya Nîştimanî ya Kurdistanê, PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
Figure 2  
Actors and Fatali­
ties in the Turkish 
Conflict with the SDF 
and PKK
Source: Map created 
by author. Data are from 
Raleigh et al. (2010), 
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(Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê, KDP) in Iraq had to make was to specifically help 
Turkey in its fight against the PKK. Consequently, the conflict between Turkey and 
the PKK spread into the KRI with full legitimisation from Erbil and Baghdad. The 
conflict effectively relocated from southeastern Turkey, where a lot of fighting oc-
curred in urban areas, to the border area of the KRI from 2016 onwards, as the 
analysis by the International Crisis Group (2020) shows. As Figure 2 confirms, this 
development has not changed since, and violent conflict between the Turkish state 
and the PKK is continuing in the KRI, claiming the highest number of Turkey–PKK 
conflict­related casualties. This shows that the violent struggle – in opposition to 
one of the ideas behind the Washington Agreement – has not found a military solu-
tion. More importantly, KRI concessions to Turkey have merely relocated arenas of 
violence, with potential for further escalation in 2021. Research by the Kurdistan 
Times news site shows how concrete this potential actually is. It reveals that the 
costs of the fight against the PKK with the help of the KRI are for the first time ever 
included as part of Turkey's official defence budget in 2021. In the document, the 
president of the KRI, Masrour Barzani, as well as the Iraqi prime minister, Mustafa 
al-Kadhimi, are also said to have allowed Turkish military operations against the 
PKK in the vast areas of northern Iraq, even beyond the KRI. This includes not only 
the classic areas of operation of the PKK in the Kandil Mountains, but also ones 
such as Sinjar and Makhmour, where thousands of civilians live (Kurdistan Times 
2021).
KRI governorates  
(Erbil & Sulaimaniya) 
(in %)
All other Iraqi  
governorates  
(in %)
Turkey 35 1 
Iran 33 30 
US 13 29 
Israel 11 23 
Syria 3 0 
Russia 2 0 
Don’t know 1 3 
Other 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 0 7 
No country 0 2 
Refused 0 2 
Unlike a number of observers suggest, the conflict today is not happening in the 
KRI’s periphery alone, but it is perceived by civilians across northern Iraq as an 
active threat. The latest Arab Barometer data suggest that Turkey’s military intru-
sion into northern Iraq is clearly present in civilian political perception. As shown 
in Table 1, most citizens from the KRI governorates believe Turkey is the country 
Table 1 
Countries Perceived 
to Threaten Stability 




ballot question: “What 
country poses the great-
est threat to stability 
in your country?” and 
“What country poses the 
greatest threat to well-
being in your country?”
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posing the greatest threat to its political stability or well-being. The fact that this 
threat is specifically targeted towards Kurds is evident in the comparison with the 
perception of respondents from the remaining Iraqi governorates in which exclu-
sively Arab majorities live. Here, only 1 per cent perceived Turkey to be the greatest 
threat.
In summary, and based on the experiences from northern Iraq, where distanc-
ing from the PKK and appeasing Turkey has not helped to achieve peace and au-
tonomy for Kurdish communities – whether in the past or the present – there is 
no reason to believe it might help in Syria in the future. Today, Turkish military 
operations are spreading widely across Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and Ankara is quite 
literally testing its military boundaries as it stretches towards North Africa and the 
Caucasus. As history has shown, the conflict cannot be resolved by military means 
alone. The PKK is one of the biggest armed Kurdish groups ever and, by definition, 
a guerrilla army: Turkey has struggled for more than 36 years to defeat it. As long 
as there is no political resolution to this transnational conflict, the vicious circle of 
conflict, radicalisation, and further armed mobilisation will continue. It is therefore 
not without reason that the PKK is still managing to recruit new fighters in the 
mountainous regions between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq that are still the most heavily 
contested. 
As for a post-war order in Syria, there is no reason to believe that a solution 
to the political deadlock of AANES lies exclusively in the hands of the SDF. On the 
contrary, lasting peace in northeastern Syria is closely linked to the overall conflict 
between Turkey and the PKK. The example of the KRI shows that past efforts by 
US mediations to simply fulfil Turkish demands while pressuring Kurdish parties 
to act as proxies were not able to solve some of the real issues on the ground. The 
major difference between the 1990s and today is that the conflict’s repercussions 
today exceed the actual Kurdish question, because it has become an integral part of 
many issues ongoing in the region, not least the war against ISIS. A US administra-
tion that repeats some of the mistakes of the late 1990s would not only threaten 
additional Kurdish civilian lives but also put at risk the very successes of six years 
of successful combat against ISIS.
Biden’s New Cabinet
As the new US president was inaugurated on 20 January and members of the ad-
ministration have taken office, it is worth looking at the president’s choices with 
regard to some of the relevant positions in his cabinet. With Antony Blinken, Lloyd 
Austin, and Brett McGurk, Biden has chosen three policymakers with extensive ex-
perience in the region whose past statements and deployments indicate that US 
policy will undergo a substantial modification as far as Turkey and the role of Kurds 
in Syria is concerned.
Joe Biden has selected 58-year-old diplomat Antony Blinken as secretary of 
state. During the Obama administration, Blinken was first deputy assistant to the 
president and national security advisor to the vice president, and later served as 
deputy secretary of state. He has advocated the US approach described above of 
trying to please Turkey while using the Kurdish on­the­ground forces to fight ISIS. 
The multilateralist commented on the war against ISIS in a New York Times arti-
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cle in 2017 titled “To Defeat ISIS, Arm the Syrian Kurds” (Blinken, 2017) – at the 
time, Raqqa was still under ISIS control: “The S.D.F. can succeed only if it is armed 
to overcome the Islamic State’s ferocious urban resistance,” he wrote, going on to 
advise Trump’s administration that “any support we provide the Syrian Democratic 
Forces should be mission­specific — just enough to do the job in Raqqa, not enough 
to risk spillover to the P.K.K.” (Blinken 2017). Blinken has often advocated that a 
policy of concessions would calm NATO partner Turkey in northern Syria. 
Biden's secretary of defence, Lloyd J. Austin, is known to have been much more 
critical than Blinken of US foreign policies under former president Obama and to 
not be much of an interventionist (Perry 2020). Nevertheless, much is to be discov-
ered about the former general, who generally avoids talking to the press. What is 
known is that he headed the withdrawal of troops from Iraq in 2011, while being op-
posed to how it was implemented. Austin is also the mind behind the international 
coalition against ISIS, which is one of the main reasons given by Biden as to why he 
chose him (Biden 2020). Austin, in that capacity, was one of the first members of 
the US military to have coordinated with the SDF, which he did when he was com-
mander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) from 2013 to 2016. 
Having crafted the strategy against ISIS from its very inception, when the organisa-
tion’s advance shocked the whole world, he knows that the gains made against ISIS 
can be lost quickly. His understanding of the importance of Kurdish forces for the 
defeat of ISIS might be of crucial importance for a modified US policy. 
Another selection of high relevance is that of Brett McGurk. The former special 
presidential envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL is known to be a strong 
opponent of Turkish expansionism in northeastern Syria. He even resigned from 
his previous position in late 2018 in protest of Trump’s initial order to withdraw 
ground troops from eastern Syria (Harb and Ragip 2021). Joe Biden’s choice of 
McGurk to be the Middle East and North Africa coordinator of the National Secu-
rity Council sends a strong signal to Turkey. There is hardly any other figure in US 
diplomacy who has established as strong links to both the Kurdish authorities in the 
KRI and AANES as McGurk has. Because of that, he is widely respected across the 
region, especially among Kurdish actors. Unsurprisingly, the nomination caused a 
great uproar in Turkish media, various outlets having even accused him of being a 
PKK supporter, as Turkish foreign minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu initially did in 2017 
(Harb and Ragip 2021).
The loudest voice of criticism towards Turkey in the new administration comes 
arguably from the new president himself. In a New York Times interview from Jan-
uary 2020, Biden talked again about making Erdoğan pay, as he had in Iowa in 
2019. He specifically pointed to Turkey’s treatment of the Kurds not only on foreign 
territory but also domestically, and stated that he wants to “[make] it clear that we 
are in a position where we have a way which was working for a while to integrate 
the Kurdish population who wanted to participate in the process in their parlia-
ment […]. He [Erdoğan] has to pay a price. He has to pay a price for whether or 
not we’re going to continue to sell certain weapons to him” (The Editorial Board of 
NYT 2020). Unlike Blinken, Biden has an eye on anti-democratic developments in 
Turkish domestic policies after the attempted coup of 2016, stating, “He [Erdoğan] 
got blown out. He got blown out in Istanbul, he got blown out in his party. So, what 
do we do now? We just sit there and yielded. And the last thing I would’ve done is 
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yielded to him concerning the Kurds. The absolute last thing” (The Editorial Board 
of NYT 2020).
The Future of US and EU Policies
All three of these Biden appointees previously served in the Obama administra-
tion. Therefore, one central question during the upcoming months will be whether 
the Biden administration will simply continue the approach of Barack Obama. The 
former president was known for wanting to end “forever wars” and to retreat from 
the Middle East, but the discussion might be different now. It might revolve around 
the question of how to not only withdraw forces but actively resolve and therefore 
end conflict. The Obama doctrine was characterised by delegating active involve-
ment either to the drone war or to governments that were considered to bring some 
stability if appeased enough. That calculation did not work out, especially in the 
Turkish case. Multilateralism has no effect when the interdependence built between 
states creates an inability to effectively counter anti­democratic and expansionist 
developments, as is the case with Turkey now.
At least since 2019, there has been very little US opposition to the increasing 
number of Turkish interventions in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, its uni-
lateral and sudden moves, and its repeated ethnically motivated attacks on Kurdish 
areas in Syria and Iraq. Especially the latter has come at great human cost but has 
also meant strategic and military loss in the war against ISIS. Eventually, a solution 
for post-ISIS Syria that enables stability and lasting peace depends on the political 
status of the AANES. That cannot be achieved without mediating peace talks be-
tween Turkey and the PKK, as this decades-old contestation (and with it, the Kurd-
ish question within Turkey) is at the very root of today’s conflicts between Kurds in 
Iraq and Syria and the Turkish military. 
To make a really substantial move, two steps are essential: First, official mul-
tilateral peace talks between the Turkish government and the PKK should be initi-
ated, in which the US and the EU take part. Second, a roadmap for Kurdish self-rule 
should be designed that transcends the phony debate of dependence vs. independ-
ence and looks at the greater issue of real institution-building within the Kurdish 
areas in Syria and Iraq by creating accountable and representative political institu-
tions. If Biden wants to bring the United States back into global politics and Middle 
Eastern affairs, initiating a discussion about the type of political framework into 
which the AANES can be embedded within a post-war order in Syria could be a 
valuable entry point. This discussion, however, cannot be held without bringing 
Turkey back into the process, ideally by holding peace talks directly with the PKK. 
If such talks succeed and an internationally recognised political status for the Kurds 
in Syria can be negotiated, the US will manage to powerfully stabilise its strongest 
bulwark against the resurgence of ISIS in the region. 
A clear US take on Turkey can also enable the EU to act more strongly and more 
coherently vis-à-vis Turkey in other contexts, such as in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
Libya, and Armenia. It is time for the EU, especially Germany, to reconsider its 
present relationship with Turkey. Neither are negotiations on EU admission ongo-
ing, nor are there clear plans to sanction Turkey. This political limbo cannot go 
on endlessly – it just encourages Turkey to keep testing its limits. Further, Ger-
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many should try to dampen the power the Turkish state has in Germany, specifically 
against political dissidents and oppositional figures who have sought refuge there. 
Much of Germany’s reluctance is rooted in its awareness of this condition. Turkish 
state networks in Germany should be dismantled to allow for both the safety of Tur-
key critics in Germany and a foreign policy that does not bend to Ankara’s influence.
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